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Abstract
Children identified as cognitively gifted, in comparison with age-matched mainstream samples, 
are  advantaged in  numerous areas,  including mathematics,  speed and efficiency in cognitive 
processing,  and resistance  to  interfering  stimuli.  Although working memory (WM) has  been 
implicated as a factor mediating these advantages, evidence suggests that gifted children may not 
be advantaged in all aspects of WM function. We hypothesized that this difference is related to 
the contrast between mental (related to prefrontal dopamine circuits) and perceptual attention 
(likely related to prefrontal acetylcholine circuits). Specifically, it was expected that cognitively 
gifted children would excel in WM tasks taxing mental but not perceptual attention. Ninety-one 
children from grades 4 and 8, in the gifted and mainstream academic streams, received WM tasks 
requiring  primarily  perceptual  attention  (SOPT)  and  mental  attention  (n-back),  as  well  as 
measures of mental-attentional capacity, shifting, and inhibition. Gifted children outperformed 
their mainstream peers on all tasks, except SOPT (even when mental demand was matched). 
Results  demonstrate  a  necessary  distinction  between  mental  and  perceptual  attention  in  the 
measurement of WM.
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Factors Underlying Cognitive Giftedness: Mental Versus Perceptual Attention
Conceptualisations of cognitive giftedness often entail an element of intellectual 
precocity (e.g., intelligence significantly exceeding the average for a given chronological age), as 
commonly measured by standardized intelligence tests. In fact, identification of gifted children 
for subsequent inclusion in gifted education programs is often still determined, at least in part, by 
performance on these standardized measures. Children identified as gifted, in comparison with 
age-matched mainstream samples, are advantaged in numerous areas, including mathematics 
(Hoard, Geary, Byrd-Craven, & Nugent, 2008), speed and efficiency in cognitive processing 
(Johnson, Im-Bolter, & Pascual-Leone, 2003; Saccuzzo, Johnson, & Guertin, 1994), and 
resistance to interfering stimuli (Johnson et al., 2003).
Working memory (WM) has been implicated as a factor mediating the demonstrated 
cognitive advantages of gifted children. That is, gifted children, in addition to superior 
performance on standardized intelligence tests, also tend to demonstrate an increased WM 
capacity in comparison with their mainstream peers (Johnson et al., 2003; Pascual-Leone & 
Johnson, 2010; Saccuzzo et al., 1994; Segalowitz, Unsal, & Dywan, 1992). This is consistent 
with research showing a strong association between performance on working memory and 
general ability measures in children and adults (e.g., Cowan et al., 2005; Cowan, Fristoe, Elliott, 
Brunner, & Saults, 2006; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999; Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005; 
Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & Mackintosh, 2009).
Complicating this relationship, however, is Segalowitz et al.’s (1992) finding that gifted 
children outperformed their mainstream counterparts on tasks of central executive function, but 
not on two visual-spatial WM tasks (for findings indicating a gifted advantage on visual-spatial 
WM tasks, see Hoard et al., 2008). A possible explanation for this dissociation among WM tasks 
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is suggested by the Theory of Constructive Operators (TCO) (Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 
1979), in its contrast between effortless perceptual (externally-driven) attention versus effortful 
mental attention - a distinction that is not readily available in contemporary WM theory. Gifted 
children, thus, may be advantaged on tasks requiring primarily mental attention (the domain-free 
aspects of WM or general executive strategies), but not on tasks that can be solved primarily with 
perceptual attention.
Attentional Processes Subserving Working Memory: Mental Versus Perceptual Attention
Although WM processing is intrinsically variable due to the variability in modality (e.g., 
visual, auditory) and domain (e.g., spatial, quantitative) across WM tasks, neuroscientific 
evidence has implicated distinct brain structures and processes consistently involved in WM. 
Foremost among these are the contributions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and prefrontal 
dopamine to the activation, inhibition, and coordination of cortical pathways (routinely bundled 
as attentional and executive functions; Diamond, Briand, Fossella, & Gehlbach, 2004; Diamond, 
Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997; Petrides & Milner, 1982; Wiegersma, van der Scheer, & 
Hijman, 1990). Despite evidence for these common mechanisms, however, recent findings have 
shown that even these domain-general components of WM are insufficient to explain the entire 
range of WM function. For instance, Diamond et al. (2004) reported that whereas success on the 
self-ordered pointing task (SOPT; a WM task commonly used to assess prefrontal executive 
function) is reliant upon the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Diamond et al., 2004; Petrides & 
Milner, 1982; Wiegersma et al., 1990), performance was unaffected by depleting prefrontal 
dopamine (DA; Diamond et al., 1997, 2004; Petrides & Milner, 1982). These findings appear 
particularly problematic for frameworks that envision a singular attentional mechanism 
subserving WM, as the recruitment of differential brain resources across tasks that are 
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purportedly homogenous (at least insofar as they commonly engage WM) suggests the 
mobilization of a discrepant set of cognitive processes toward task completion. 
In resolving the inability of prefrontal DA to account for the broad range of WM 
functions, the Theory of Constructive Operators (TCO) distinguishes between effortless 
perceptual (externally-driven) attention and effortful mental attention – a distinction that is not 
readily available in contemporary WM theory (Pascual-Leone & Goodman, 1979).  The TCO 
further hypothesizes that these distinct forms of attention are mediated by different 
neurotransmitters according to the functional characteristics of the task (Pascual-Leone & 
Johnson, 2006). Perceptual attention, believed to be mediated by the acetylcholinergic 
neurotransmitter, refers to cognitive processing of external (perceptually available) information 
(Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2006). In contrast, mental attention, believed to be mediated by the 
dopaminergic neurotransmitter, entails the voluntary, often effortful cognitive processing of 
internal (mental) information, which functions with relative autonomy from perceptual input 
(Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2006). These hypotheses receive support from findings that 
prefrontal functioning in strongly misleading situations (e.g., as in the n-back task) is supported 
by the DA-system (Braver & Barch, 2002; Luciana, Hanson, & Whitley, 2004; Mehta, Manes, 
Magnolfi, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Mollion, Ventre-Dominey, Dominey, & Brousolle, 2003), 
whereas facilitating situations, as in the SOPT, are thought to be supported by prefrontal 
acetylcholine (ACh) (Foldi, White, & Schaefer, 2005; for a review of ACh function see Sarter & 
Bruno, 1997).
Linking Mental Attention, Perceptual Attention, Working Memory, and Giftedness
Although previous evidence has shown gifted children tend to outperform their 
mainstream peers on measures of WM capacity, mental-attentional (M-) capacity, and executive 
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function (Johnson et al., 2003; Johnson, Pascual-Leone, Im-Bolter, & Verrilli, 2004), it is not 
clear to what extent, as a group, higher gifted performance on WM and M-measures is due to 
advanced capacity versus superior executive skills. This lack of clarity stems from the fact that 
heightened performance on M-measures may result from a heightened M-capacity, superior 
executive processes, or both, due to the concurrent requirement for activation and inhibition in 
these tasks. Further sources of activation exist in WM measures (e.g., overlearning, affect), 
whereby mental attention is but one of these possible sources of high activation. From this 
perspective, M-capacity can be seen as the causal factor underlying developmental growth in 
WM (Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2005). Further, in conjunction with learning, the maturation of 
M-capacity (from one symbolic unit at 3-4 years of age to seven symbolic units at 15+ years, 
increasing one unit approximately every two years) leads to increasingly complex cognition and 
performance across development. In contrast, perceptual attention (controlled by the brain’s 
default network) is believed to develop earlier and more rapidly than mental attention.
In the present study we sought to investigate the factors underlying cognitive giftedness 
by examining the TCO’s contrast between mental and perceptual attention in gifted and 
mainstream children. It was predicted that gifted children can be distinguished by a superior 
executive repertoire, such that they should perform better than mainstream peers on a high-
executive-demand task requiring mental attention (i.e., n-back updating task). However, they 
should not show superior performance on a lower-executive-demand task that involves primarily 
perceptual attention (i.e., SOPT), even when the updating element and mental demand of the 
tasks are equated. Conversely, if gifted children are found to score higher on both tasks (i.e., both 
metal and perceptual attention), then M-capacity alone (which can also be used in perceptual 
tasks) may be sufficient, without regard to executive repertoire, to distinguish gifted children 
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from mainstream ones. On the premise that gifted children possess a sophisticated executive 
repertoire, it was further hypothesized that gifted children would outperform their mainstream 
peers on executive function tasks. As executive strategies can be learned, such a result would 
suggest that the demonstrated advantages of gifted children are, at least in part, learned. If so, 
there exists the possibility that appropriate educational initiatives could narrow the demonstrated 
performance gap between gifted and mainstream students. 
Method
Participants
Participants were 91 children from an elementary school in the Greater Toronto Area. 
They were from grades 4 and 8 and from gifted and mainstream academic programmes. The four 
groups were: grade 4 mainstream (n=22), grade 4 gifted (n=28), grade 8 mainstream (n=22), and 
grade 8 gifted (n=19). Students categorized as gifted were in congregated classrooms for children 
identified as gifted. Identification required a minimum achievement of 97th percentile on Board-
approved standardized intelligence or ability tests. Children categorized as mainstream in the 
current study were in regular classrooms. The sample was comprised of 45 girls and 46 boys. 
Age ranged from 9.28 to 14.23 years (grade 4: M=9.81, SD=0.33; grade 8: M=13.72, SD=0.31). 
Measures
All computer-based measures were presented on a Dell Latitude D820 laptop computer 
and were programmed in E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Responses 
to the SOPT were made via a KTMT-1700W Magic Touch add-on touch screen (Keytec Inc., 
Garland, TX) using a stylus. 
Higher executive-demand measure, primarily requiring mental attention: N-back. 
The n-back requires subjects to mentally update the set of relevant stimuli at the expense of those 
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that are no longer task-relevant (Cohen et al., 1997; Friedman et al., 2006; Im-Bolter, Johnson, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2006; Nystrom et al., 2000). Subjects must evaluate whether the currently 
presented stimulus matches a stimulus presented n items earlier, which is no longer perceptually 
available. It carries high executive demand and requires mobilization of mental attention. We 
predicted that gifted children would score higher on updating trials.
This computer-based task had three conditions, presented in ascending order of difficulty. 
Stimuli were three-dot patterns that were presented serially on a computer screen. In the 0-back 
condition, subjects identified whether or not each new stimulus matched a particular 3-dot target 
pattern. In the 1-back condition, they identified whether or not each new pattern matched the 
immediately preceding one (i.e., 1 item back). This condition required subjects to update the 
contents of WM after each presentation. The 2-back condition required subjects to match the 
current pattern to the one presented two items earlier in the sequence (i.e., 2 items back). This 
condition required the continual and serial updating of the two most recent patterns. 
There were nine distinct three-dot patterns, presented in a semi-random order. For each 
condition children received verbal training, 15 paper-based practice trials on 5x8 inch cue cards, 
14 computer-based practice trials, and 54 task trials (4 non-scored preparation trials, 30 non-
match test trials, and 20 match test trials). The paper-based practice trials were repeated a 
maximum of three times, if the child did not understand the instructions (evidenced by one or 
more incorrect responses). Participants indicated with a key press whether or not the current 
pattern matched the target pattern (0-back) or the pattern seen one or two trials earlier. Each 
stimulus was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 2500 ms gap, during which the subject could 
respond. A tone signalled responses that were incorrect or made beyond the trial time limit. We 
report data on the proportion of correct target identifications (i.e., match trials). 
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Lower executive-demand measures, primarily requiring perceptual attention: SOPT. 
The self-ordered pointing task (SOPT; originally developed by Petrides & Milner, 1982) is 
a WM task of prefrontal executive function. Subjects repeatedly see the same set of stimuli 
(rearranged on each trial) and must point to a new stimulus on each trial. The SOPT is 
facilitating, because the relevant stimuli are always perceptually available, and it carries 
minimal executive demand (i.e., little need for inhibition, shifting, or updating). We 
predicted that gifted children would score equivalently to mainstream children on the 
SOPT. 
We used the abstract stimuli condition of the SOPT version developed by Cragg and 
Nation (2007). Subjects were shown a set of abstract designs (4, 6, 8, or 10 designs) on a laptop 
screen, and could select (i.e., touch) any design to begin. Upon making a selection, the next 
screen appeared with the same designs in different locations. With each screen, subjects had to 
select a new design, without duplicating a selection, thus attempting to select each design exactly 
once. Each set was repeated three times successively, separated by a screen indicating the 
“game” number, differing only in stimuli locations. The designs within the three presentations of 
each set size remained constant; however, novel abstract designs were adopted for each set size. 
Designs measured 43 x 43 mm and were black and white presented on a blue background (for 
examples see Cragg & Nation, 2007). Task levels were presented in order of ascending set size, 
with the first (4 design) level used as training. Abstract designs were chosen due to the difficulty 
of encoding them verbally, thereby minimizing the possible influence of differential linguistic 
ability between groups. We report data for a span score (mean number of correct touches until 
the first error, not including the first touch for which an error is not possible). Results were 
similar when data were analyzed in terms of accuracy (proportion correct selections). 
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In order to complexify the SOPT we developed a version that required updating; we call 
this the U-SOPT. The updating component was introduced in order to match the mental demand 
(in terms of M-capacity) and updating requirement of the n-back, yet preserve the task’s demand 
primarily for perceptual attention. Only the 4, 6, and 8 design levels were administered in the U-
SOPT, and again, the 4-design level was used for training. In addition to selecting a new design 
on each screen, subjects had to indicate their just-previous selection. For example, upon reaching 
the second screen, they were required to choose a previously unselected (‘new’) design, followed 
by indicating the (‘old’) selection that immediately preceded this. After subjects indicated their 
selections, the stimuli would rearrange (via the experimenter’s press of the spacebar on an 
external keyboard). The stimuli remained the same as for each corresponding level of the 
standard SOPT. As with the SOPT, we report data on mean span until the first error of any sort 
(mean number of correct screens until the first error, not including the first screen for which an 
error is not possible).
M-capacity measures. The Figural Intersections Task (FIT; Pascual-Leone & 
Baillargeon, 1994; Pascual-Leone & Ijaz, 1989; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010) is a paper-
based measure of M-capacity. Each item is comprised of a set of two to eight discrete shapes on 
the right-hand side of the page, and the same set of shapes in an overlapping configuration on the 
left-hand side (in some items there is an additional irrelevant shape, to be ignored, on the left). 
Subjects must locate the one area of common intersection of the relevant overlapping shapes on 
the left. Item level is defined as the number of relevant shapes to be held in mind in order to find 
the intersection. Item level also corresponds to the demand of items in terms of need for M-
capacity (i.e., M-demand; Pascual-Leone & Baillargeon, 1994; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010). 
The FIT was administered in one group session for each class, with each subject 
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independently completing his or her own booklet. FIT booklets consisted of 36 randomly ordered 
items (ranging from difficulty levels 2 to 8). There were 5 items at each difficulty level 2 through 
8, with the exception of level 4 which had 6 items. Training was provided to the group in the 
context of 8 practice items. FIT M-score corresponded to the highest item level with at least 80% 
of items solved correctly, provided all lower levels also reached the 80% threshold with one 
lower level permitted to fall to 60%. 
The Direction Following Task (DFT) is a linguistic measure of M-capacity (Agostino, 
Johnson, & Pascual-Leone, 2010; Cunning, 2003; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Pascual-Leone & 
Johnson, 2010). Subjects use cut-outs that vary in shape (circle or square), colour (white, blue, 
green, red, or yellow), and size (small or large) in order to carry out verbal directions of 
increasing complexity. The directions require placing a cut-out onto a space on a wooden board 
(i.e., “place X on Y”). Spaces vary in size and color. 
The task consisted of 35 graded items (5 items at each of seven levels of complexity), 
preceded by verbal training and 5 practice items. Complexity was a function of the number of 
objects, spaces, and characteristics in the direction (e.g., “Place a white square on a small blue 
space,” “Place a red square and a white circle on a small yellow space”). Directions referring to 
two objects had to be carried out in the specified order. The shapes and board were covered while 
each instruction (item) was read aloud, after which the stimuli were made available to the subject 
to carry out the instruction. 
The M-demand of DFT levels is a function of the number of elements within the 
instruction that must be activated simultaneously with mental attention. Theoretical M-demand 
estimates have been validated empirically (Cunning, 2003; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Pascual-Leone 
& Johnson, 2005, 2010). DFT M-score corresponded to the M-demand of the most complex level 
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with at least 60% of items solved correctly, provided all lower levels also reached the 60% 
threshold with one lower level permitted to fall to 40%. Consistent with previous findings, we 
expected gifted students to score higher than mainstream students on the M-tasks.
Executive function tasks. The Contingency Naming Task (CNT) was designed by 
Taylor, Albo, Phebus, Sachs, and Bierl (1987) as a cognitive flexibility measure (see also, 
Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; Anderson, Anderson, Northam, & 
Taylor, 2000). It has since been used as a measure of shifting or task switching (e.g., Agostino et 
al., 2010; Mazzocco & Kover, 2007). The task involves two simple naming trials, as well as a 
one-dimensional and a two-dimensional shifting trial. These trials are presented in order of 
increasing difficulty. 
The stimulus card contained three rows of nine coloured (blue, green, and pink) shapes 
(square, circle, and triangle), each enclosing an inner shape (square, circle, and triangle). Above 
three of the stimuli in each row there was a backward pointing arrow. Subjects named aloud the 
color or outer shape of each stimulus, based on a set of rules. In the first trial, they named the 
colour of each design, and in the second trial named the outer shapes. The one-dimensional 
shifting trial required them to name the color of the design when the inner and outer shapes 
matched, but to name the outer shape when there was no match. The two-dimensional shifting 
trial involved switching between two rules: 1) maintain the rule from the previous one-
dimensional switching task; but 2) reverse this rule when a backward arrow appeared above a 
design. Instructions emphasized both speed and accuracy.
Before each trial condition, children were introduced to the relevant rule and practiced it 
on a seven-design practice card. Practice was repeated until all seven responses were correct or a 
maximum of five practice trials had been administered. For each trial condition, the tester noted 
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errors and used a hand-held stopwatch to record the time taken to respond to all 27 stimuli. We 
report data for an efficiency score that reflects both accuracy and speed. It is calculated by the 
following formula: [(1/ time to complete the sub-task) / SQRT (errors + 1)] x 100, and a higher 
score represents better ability to shift (Anderson et al., 2000).
The Antisaccade task (adapted from Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 
2000) indexes inhibitory control (Agostino et al., 2010; Im-Bolter et al., 2006; Miyake et al., 
2000). The prepotent response in this task is to perform a saccade in the direction of a visual cue 
that suddenly enters the visual field. For successful performance, however, subjects must inhibit 
this saccade. While focusing on a fixation point, subjects are faced with a visual cue (a solid 
black square) on one side of a computer screen, promptly followed by a target stimulus (an arrow 
pointing up, right, or left inside a box) on the opposite side of the screen. They must inhibit their 
reflexive saccade toward the visual cue, instead looking toward the target stimulus on the 
opposite side of the screen, in order to identify the target before it is masked. Failure to inhibit 
this saccade results in subjects’ being unable to accurately identify the direction the target 
stimulus was pointing (indicated by pressing the ‘←’, ‘↑’, or ‘→’ key on the laptop keyboard). 
The timing of stimuli presentation was as follows: a fixation cross for a variable time (1500-3500 
ms); a blank screen for 50 ms; a cue for 225 ms; a target for 100 ms, followed by a mask that 
remained on screen until a response was made.
Twenty-two practice trials and 90 target trials were administered. The order of stimuli 
(arrow direction and left vs. right side of screen) was determined randomly for each subject. 
Scores were proportion correct target identifications and latency for correct responses. 
Procedure
Tasks were administered in three sessions, two individual (in a separate, quiet classroom) 
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and one group (in the students’ homeroom), each about 40 minutes long. Order of task 
administration was held constant as follows: Individual Session 1 – Self-Ordered Pointing Task, 
Updating Self-Ordered Pointing Task, Contingency Naming Task, Direction Following Task; 
Individual Session 2 – n-back, Antisaccade; and Group Session – Figural Intersections Task.
Results
Data Screening
Data first were screened for normality and sphericity. Because sphericity consistently was 
violated, an adjusted degrees of freedom analysis (Greenhouse-Geisser) was conducted for all 
within-subjects effects. For all task scores in which outliers were present (i.e., n-back, DFT, 
antisaccade accuracy, and antisaccade latency) analyses were run with and without extreme 
observations. Because the pattern of results did not differ for any variable, we retained these 
observations in all reported analyses.
N-back. Due to demand for mental attention, we predicted that gifted students would 
score higher than mainstream peers on updating conditions of the n-back task. We conducted a 
Greenhouse-Geisser (G-G) 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 3 (condition) ANOVA on proportion of 
correct responses on trials in which there was a match between stimulus and target (i.e., correct 
target identification). There were main effects for stream, F(1, 87) = 8.81, p = .004, partial η2 = .
09; grade, F(1, 87) = 7.86, p = .006, partial η2 = .08; and n-back condition, F(1.771, 154.071) = 
238.02, p < .001, partial η2 = .73. Overall, gifted students scored higher than mainstream peers, 
grade 8s scored higher than grade 4s, and contrasts showed that scores decreased with each 
increase in n-back level.
There were Stream x Condition, F(1.771, 154.071) = 6.16, p = .004, partial η2 = .07; and 
Grade x Condition interactions, F(1.771, 154.071) = 3.84, p = .028, partial η2 = .04. These were 
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conditioned by a Stream x Grade x Condition interaction, F(1.771, 154.071) = 6.46, p = .003, η2 
= .07. This interaction can be understood as follows: 1) There was no gifted advantage on the 
simple 0-back task; 2) gifted children in both grades showed an advantage on the moderately 
difficult 1-back task; and 3) on the difficult 2-back task, there was a gifted advantage only for the 
older children—indeed, mainstream grade 8s and both groups of grade 4s performed at chance 
level on this task.
Self-ordered pointing task (SOPT). If giftedness in childhood is characterized by high 
performance in tasks with high demand for both mental attention and executive processing, then 
we would not expect a gifted advantage on a task such as SOPT, which is facilitated by 
perceptual attention. We examined mean span (i.e., mean number of correct touches till an error) 
with a G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 3 (condition) ANOVA. Grade 8s had longer spans than grade 
4s, F(1, 88) = 8.50, p = .004, partial η2 = .09; and span increased as number of designs increased, 
F(1.762, 155.081) = 36.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .29. Gifted and mainstream children did not, 
however, differ in terms of span score on any of the task conditions, F(1, 88) = 0.70, p = .407, 
partial η2 = .01. We examined two other scores derived from the SOPT and found no difference 
between gifted and mainstream students in mean number of correct responses, F(1, 88) = 1.31, p 
= .256, partial η2 = .02; or median latency for correct responses, F(1, 77) = 2.54, p = .115, partial 
η2 = .03. These results could be due, however, to factors other than SOPT performance being 
facilitated by perceptual attention. SOPT differs from the n-back both in terms of executive 
demand and demand for mental attention (or working memory). 
Updating self-ordered pointing task (U-SOPT). We thus modified the SOPT by adding 
an updating component that should increase the mental demand of the task, while maintaining its 
primary reliance on perceptual attention. We report data for mean span (i.e., mean number of 
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correct screens) before an error of any kind. A G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 2 (condition) 
ANOVA was conducted. Similar to results with the SOPT, grade 8s outperformed grade 4s, F(1, 
88) = 21.20, p < .001, partial η2 = .19; and span increased with the number of designs, F(1, 88) = 
52.14, p < .001, partial η2 = .37. However, gifted and mainstream children did not differ in terms 
of span score in any of the U-SOPT task conditions, F(1, 88) = 1.33, p = .253, partial η2 = .02. 
This pattern of results held even when span scores were analyzed separately for ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
touches. Similarly, there were no effects involving academic stream when data were analyzed in 
terms of mean number of correct old or new touches. Thus, consistent with predictions, gifted 
children scored higher on the n-back but not on SOPT or U-SOPT. 
M-measures. We predicted that gifted students would out-score mainstream peers on 
measures of M-capacity. A 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA on the FIT M-score yielded main 
effects for stream, F(1, 86) = 10.70, p = .002, partial η2 = .11; and grade, F(1, 86) = 34.13, p < .
001, partial η2 = .28. Gifted students scored higher than their mainstream peers, and grade 8s 
scored higher than grade 4s. Further, performance levels corresponded closely to theoretically 
predicted values (Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010). That is, grade 4 mainstream children (aged 
9-10) obtained mean M-scores close to four, and grade 8 mainstream children (aged 13-14) 
obtained mean M-scores close to six. Gifted children, in contrast, scored approximately one level 
higher than their mainstream counterparts (i.e., about 5 for grade 4s and about 7 for grade 8s). 
A 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA run on the Direction Following Task (DFT) M-score 
yielded main effects for stream, F(1, 88) = 13.25, p < .001, partial η2 = .13; and grade, F(1, 88) = 
20.45, p < .001, partial η2 = .19. Gifted students scored higher than their mainstream peers, and 
grade 8s scored higher than grade 4s. Performance level mirrored theoretical prediction for grade 
4 mainstream students, but grade 8 mainstream students tended to underperform on the DFT 
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relative to FIT and theoretical predictions. Still, gifted students in both grades scored about one 
unit higher than their mainstream peers.
Shifting measure. The Contingency Naming Task (CNT) efficiency score conjointly 
reflects speed and accuracy. A G-G 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) x 4 (condition) ANOVA yielded main 
effects for condition, F(2.26, 198.92) = 515.94, p < .001, partial η2 = .85; grade, F(1, 88) = 
66.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .43; and stream, F(1, 88) = 10.89, p = .001, partial η2 = .11. 
Efficiency scores were higher for grade 8s than grade 4s, higher for gifted over mainstream 
students, and higher for naming (i.e., trials one and two) than for shifting trials (i.e., trials three 
and four). These main effects were conditioned by a Grade x Condition interaction, F(2.26, 
198.92) = 8.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .09, indicating a significant difference between grade 8s and 
grade 4s at all task levels, although this difference decreased as task difficulty increased. These 
effects were further conditioned by a Grade x Stream x Condition interaction, F(2.26, 198.92) = 
3.02, p = .045, partial η2 = .03. This interaction suggests a gifted advantage on the shifting trials 
but not on simple speed of naming trials; this advantage held only for grade 8 gifted students on 
trial four, possibly due to the high M-demand of the two-dimensional shifting task. This gifted 
advantage on shifting trials, but not on speeded naming trials, was maintained in separate 
analyses of accuracy, F(1, 88) = 23.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .21; and latency, F(1, 82) = 7.58, p = 
.007, partial η2 = .09 (although the gifted advantage was found only in grade 8 for latency).
Inhibition measure. Proportion correct target identifications on the antisaccade task was 
examined with a 2 (stream) x 2 (grade) ANOVA. It yielded main effects for grade, F(1, 87) = 
18.93, p < .001, partial η2 = .18; and stream, F(1, 87) = 7.11, p = .009, partial η2 = .08. Gifted 
children were more accurate than mainstream children, and grade 8s were more accurate than 
grade 4s. Analysis of median response times demonstrated a main effect for grade, F(1, 87) = 
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49.69, p < .001, partial η2 = .36; but not for stream, F(1, 87) = 0.51, p = .479, partial η2 = .01. 
Grade 8s responded faster than grade 4s did. In sum, grade 8 students performed better than 
grade 4’s on all tasks. As predicted, gifted students scored higher than mainstream on all tasks, 
except the two SOPT versions.
Correlations. Because correlations computed across the entire sample would conflate 
age and stream differences, making interpretation difficult, we present correlations computed 
within stream and with age partialled out (correlations thus reflect individual differences). There 
were few significant correlations for the gifted sample. Theoretically, most of the shared variance 
between FIT and DFT should be due to age; thus, a low correlation is expected when age 
variance is removed. The general absence of correlations between M-scores and other tasks 
suggests that rather than relying on an advanced endogenous mental-attentional capacity or 
general executive know-how, gifted children may rely on more specialized (task-specific) 
executive skills. This is in accordance with the hypothesis that gifted (but not mainstream) 
children will have already acquired a sophisticated executive repertoire. 
In contrast, there were numerous inter-task correlations in the mainstream sample. The 
M-tasks correlated with the 2-back (FIT only), SOPT, U-SOPT, and CNT. Switching efficiency 
in the CNT correlated with all other tasks. The antisaccade correlated with 2-back and switching. 
This pattern suggests that mainstream children may be relying more on general capacity or 
general executive know-how. That is, in line with predictions, the mainstream children, unlike 
their gifted peers, may have fewer specific executive schemes that selectively apply in particular 
tasks. Instead, mainstream students may rely on general executives and M-capacity, as is 
demonstrated by the significant correlation between the average M-capacity score (the mean of 
FIT and DFT M-scores) and all other measures.
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Discussion
Consistent with past research (Johnson et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2004; Navarro et al., 
2006; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2010), and as predicted, gifted children demonstrated an 
advantage over their mainstream peers on tasks mobilizing primarily mental attention, but not 
those involving primarily perceptual attention (even when it was made more complex by adding 
an updating component). That is, gifted children scored higher than mainstream peers on the n-
back WM task, as well as measures of M-capacity, inhibition, and task switching. Gifted children 
did not score higher on the SOPT, however, even when it was made more complex by adding an 
updating component. 
These results suggest why a construal of WM as the significant factor underlying 
cognitive giftedness fails to adequately explain the gifted advantage. However, characterizing 
giftedness in terms of heightened M-capacity can be similarly problematic. Indeed, performance 
on measures of M-capacity is co-determined by an individual’s organismic M-capacity and their 
‘executive know-how’ (e.g., problem solving strategies), thereby raising the question of whether 
this mental attentional advantage is related to a heightened endogenous M-capacity or a superior 
repertoire of executive strategies. 
In support of a disparate executive know-how between the educational streams (i.e., 
gifted vs. mainstream), and as predicted, gifted children demonstrated superior performance on 
tasks of higher executive demand (i.e., 1-back, 2-back, M-measures, antisaccade, contingency 
naming task). This advantage did not appear, however, on tasks of lower executive demand (i.e., 
SOPT, U-SOPT, 0-back, and speeded naming trials of the contingency naming task). In fact, if 
the gifted advantage were attributable solely to an advanced organismic M-capacity, superior 
performance should be expected across all tasks because mental attention could be recruited in 
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support of perceptual attentional resources, thereby boosting gifted performance on the SOPT 
and U-SOPT as well. Conversely, and in line with the current results, if the gifted advantage is 
attributable to superior executive repertoires, this would provide little advantage on the lower-in-
executive-demand (in relation to the n-back) SOPT and U-SOPT.
As children’s executive know-how is largely influenced by learning, these findings open 
an interesting avenue towards educational programs that, equipped with these distinctions, may 
provide a means for active academic enrichment applicable to all children. This possibility was 
supported by the suggestion that the gifted advantage appears, in M-normal children, to be 
related to a superior repertoire of executive schemes, thereby emphasizing learned advantages 
and training programs rather than focusing on inherent organismic differences. One potentially 
viable educational direction for bridging the performance gap between identified gifted and 
mainstream children might involve increasing the exposure to novel problem situations and other 
executive-enhancing situations. That is, rather than constructing higher-order, subject-specific 
concepts by way of facilitating construction of lower-order requisite knowledge structures, 
executive know-how might be better developed by supplying children with suitable problem 
situations in which children can explore (with suitable cognitive guidance) the relations and 
invariances across situations. Through repeated exposure to this mode of learning, it could be 
expected that children develop an enhanced repertoire of executive schemes (e.g., strategies) that 
foster increased success in transferring specific knowledge to novel situations or novel 
applications (a common requirement within educational assessment). Although this study 
provides clear support for these claims, further study is required to strengthen and develop these 
possibilities.
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 21
References
Agostino, A., Johnson, J., & Pascual-Leone, J. (2010). Executive functions underlying 
multiplicative reasoning: Problem type matters. Journal of Experimental Child  
Psychology, 105, 286-305. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2009.09.006
Anderson, V. A., Anderson, P., Northam, E., Jacobs, R., & Catroppa, C. (2001). Development of 
executive functions through late childhood and adolescence in an Australian sample. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 20, 385-406. doi:10.1207/S15326942DN2001_5
Anderson, P., Anderson, V., Northam, E., & Taylor, H. (2000). Standardization of the 
Contingency Naming Test for school-aged children: A new measure of reactive flexibility. 
Clinical Neuropsychological Assessment, 1, 247-273.
Braver, T. S., & Barch, D. M. (2002). A theory of cognitive control, aging, cognition, and 
neuromodulation. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 26, 809-817. 
doi:10.1016/S0149-7634(02)00067-2
Cohen, J. D., Perlstein, W. M., Braver, T. S., Nystrom, L. E., Noll, D. C., Jonides, J., & Smith, E. 
E. (1997). Temporal dynamics of brain activation during a working memory task. Nature,  
386, 604-608. doi:10.1038/386604a0
Cowan, N., Elliott, E. M., Saults, J. S., Morey, C. C., Mattox, S., Hismjatullina, A., & Conway, 
A. R. A. (2005). On the capacity of attention: Its estimation and its role in working 
memory and cognitive aptitudes. Cognitive Psychology, 51, 42-100. 
doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.12.001
Cowan, N., Fristoe, N. M., Elliott, E. M., Brunner, R. P., & Saults, J. S. (2006). Scope of 
attention, control of attention, and intelligence in children and adults. Memory & 
Cognition, 34, 1754-1768. doi:10.3758/BF03195936
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 22
Cragg, L, & Nation, K. (2007). Self-ordered pointing as a test of working memory in typically 
developing children. Memory, 15, 526-535. doi:10.1080/09658210701390750
Cunning, S. (2003). The direction-following task: Assessing mental capacity through the  
linguistic domain. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, York University, Toronto, Canada.
Diamond, A., Briand, L., Fossella, J., & Gehlbach, L. (2004). Genetic and neurochemical 
modulation of prefrontal cognitive functions in children. American Journal of Psychiatry,  
161, 125-132. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.161.1.125
Diamond, A., Prevor, M., Callender, G., & Druin, D. P. (1997). Prefrontal cortex cognitive 
deficits in children treated early and continuously for PKU [Monograph]. Monographs of  
the Society for Research in Child Development, 62, (pp. 1-205). doi: 10.2307/1166208
Engle, R. W., Kane, M. J., & Tuholski, S. W. (1999). Individual differences in working memory 
capacity and what they tell us about controlled attention, general fluid intelligence, and 
functions of the prefrontal cortex. In A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.), Models of working 
memory: Mechanisms of active maintenance and executive control (pp. 62-101). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Foldi, N. S., White, R. E., & Schaefer, L. A. (2005). Detecting effects of donepezil on visual 
selective attention using signal detection parameters in Alzheimer’s disease. International  
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 20, 485-488. doi:10.1002/gps.1319
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Corley, R. P., Young, S. E., DeFries, J. C., & Hewitt, J. H. (2006). 
Not all executive functions are related to intelligence. Psychological Science, 17, 172-179. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01681.x
Heitz, R. P., Unsworth, N., & Engle, R. W. (2005). Working memory capacity, attentional 
control, and fluid intelligence. In O. Wilhelm & R. W. Engle (Eds.), Handbook of  
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 23
understanding and measuring intelligence (pp. 61-78). London, UK: Sage Publications.
Hoard, M. K., Geary, D. C., Byrd-Craven, J., & Nugent, L. (2008). Mathematical cognition in 
intellectually precocious first graders. Developmental Neuropsychology, 33, 251-276. 
doi:10.1080/87565640801982338
Im-Bolter, N., Johnson, J., & Pascual-Leone, J. (2006). Processing limitations in children with 
specific language impairment: The role of executive function. Child Development, 77,  
1822-1841. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00976.x
Johnson, J., Im-Bolter, N., & Pascual-Leone, J. (2003). Development of mental attention in 
gifted and mainstream children: The role of mental capacity, inhibition, and speed of 
processing. Child Development, 74, 1594-1614. doi:10.1046/j.1467-8624.2003.00626.x
Johnson, J., Pascual-Leone, J., Im-Bolter, N., & Verrilli, E. (2004, July). Executive functions and 
mental attention in cognitively gifted children. Poster session presented at the meeting of 
the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, Ghent, Belgium.
Kaufman, S. B., DeYoung, C. G., Gray, J. R., Brown, J., & Mackintosh, N. (2009). Associative 
learning predicts intelligence above and beyond working memory and processing speed. 
Intelligence, 37, 374-382. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2009.03.004
Luciana, M., Hanson, K. L., & Whitley, C. B. (2004). A preliminary report on dopamine system 
reactivity in PKU: Acute effects of haloperidol on neuropsychological, physiological, and 
neuroendocrine functions. Psychophramacology, 175, 18-25.
Mazzocco, M. M., & Kover, S. T. (2007). A longitudinal assessment of executive function skills 
and their association with math performance. Child Neuropsychology, 13, 18-45. 
doi:10.1080/09297040600611346
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 24
Mehta, M. A., Manes, F. F., Magnolfi, G., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2004). Impaired 
set-shifting and dissociable effects on tests of spatial working memory following the 
dopamine D2 receptor antagonist sulpride in human volunteers. Psychopharmacology,  
176, 331-342. doi:10.1007/s00213-004-1899-2
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., & Howerter, A. (2000). The unity 
and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex “frontal lobe” 
tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49-100. 
doi:10.1006/cogp.1999.0734
Mollion, H., Ventre-Dominey, J., Dominey, P. F., & Brousolle, E. (2003). Dissociable effects of 
dopaminergic therapy on spatial versus non-spatial working memory in Parkinson’s 
disease. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1442-1451. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(03)00114-3
Nystrom, L. E., Braver, T. S., Sabb, F. W., Delgado, M. R., Noll, D. C., & Cohen, J. D. (2000). 
Working memory for letters, shapes, and locations: fMRI evidence against stimulus-based 
regional organization in human prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage, 11, 424-446. 
doi:10.1006/nimg.2000.0572
Pascual-Leone, J., & Baillargeon, R. (1994). Developmental measurement of mental attention. 
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 17,161-200.
Pascual-Leone, J., & Goodman, D. (1979). Intelligence and experience: A neopiagetian 
approach. Instructional Science, 8, 301-367. doi:10.1007/BF00117011
Pascual-Leone, J., & Ijaz, H. (1989). Mental capacity testing as a form of intellectual-
development assessment. In R. Samuda, S. Kong, J. Cummins, J. Pascual-Leone, & J. 
Lewis (Eds.), Assessment and placement of minority students (pp. 144-171). Toronto, 
Canada: Hogrefe & Huber.
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 25
Pascual-Leone, J., & Johnson, J. (2005). A dialectical constructivist view of developmental 
intelligence. In O. Wilhelm & R. W. Engle (Eds.), Handbook of understanding and 
measuring intelligence (pp. 177-201). London, UK: Sage Publications.
Pascual-Leone, J., & Johnson, J. (2006). Cognitive neuropsychology as the psychology of brain 
processes: A dialectical constructivist interpretation. Unpublished manuscript, York 
University, Toronto, Canada.
Pascual-Leone, J., & Johnson, J. (2010). A developmental theory of mental attention: Its 
applications to measurement and task analysis. In P. Barrouillet & V. Gaillard (Eds.), 
Cognitive development and working memory: From neo-Piagetian to cognitive approaches  
(pp. 13-46). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Petrides, M., & Milner, B. (1982). Deficits on subject-ordered tasks after frontal- and temporal-
lobe lesions in man. Neuropsychologia, 2, 249-262. doi:10.1016/0028-3932(82)90100-2
Saccuzzo, D. P., Johnson, N. E., & Guertin, T. L. (1994). Information processing in gifted versus 
nongifted African American, Latino, Filipino, and White children: Speeded versus 
nonspeeded paradigms. Intelligence, 19, 219-243. doi:10.1016/0160-2896(94)90014-0
Sarter, M., & Bruno, J. P. (1997). Cognitive functions of cortical acetylcholine: Toward a 
unifying hypothesis. Brain Research Reviews, 23, 28-46. doi:10.1016/S0165-
0173(96)00009-4
Segalowitz, S. J., Unsal, A., & Dywan, J. (1992). Cleverness and wisdom in 12-year-olds: 
Electrophysiological evidence for late maturation of the frontal lobe. Developmental  
Neuropsychology, 8, 279-298. doi:10.1080/87565649209540528
Taylor, H. G., Albo, V., Phebus, C., Sachs, B., & Bierl, P. (1987). Postirradiation treatment 
outcomes for children with Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia: Clarification of Risks. 
Mental Versus Perceptual 
Attention 26
Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 12, 395-411. doi:10.1093/jpepsy/12.3.395
Wiegersma, S., van der Scheer, E., & Hijman, R. (1990). Subjective ordering, short-term 
memory, and the frontal lobes. Neuropsychologia, 28, 95-98. doi:10.1016/0028-
3932(90)90089-7
